State of Utah v. Kenneth Paul Hunter : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2003
State of Utah v. Kenneth Paul Hunter : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Maraget P. Lindsay; Aldrich; Nelson; Weight & Esplin; Counsel for Appellant.
Jeffrey S. Gray; Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Utah Attorney General; Vincent B.
Meister; Salt Lake District Attorneys Office; Counsel for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Hunter, No. 20030126 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2003).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/4202
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
KENNETH PAUL HUNTER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20030126-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
AN APPEAL FROM CONVICTIONS FOR FELONY MURDER, A FIRST 
DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203 
(SUPP. 2001), AND AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, A FIRST DEGREE 
FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-302 (SUPP. 
2001), IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH, SALT 
LAKE COUNTY, THE HONORABLE ROBIN W. REESE PRESIDING 
JEFFREY S. GRAY (5852) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
PO BOX 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
MARGARET P. LINDSAY Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin 
43 East 200 North P.O. Box "L" VINCENT B. MEISTER 
Provo, UT 84603-0200 Salt Lake District Attorney's Office 
Counsel for Appellant Counsel for Appellee 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
KENNETH PAUL HUNTER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20030126-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
AN APPEAL FROM CONVICTIONS FOR FELONY MURDER, A FIRST 
DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203 
(SUPP. 2001), AND AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, A FIRST DEGREE 
FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-302 (SUPP. 
2001), IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH, SALT 
LAKE COUNTY, THE HONORABLE ROBIN W. REESE PRESIDING 
JEFFREY S. GRAY (5852) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
PO BOX 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
MARGARET P. LINDSAY Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin 
43 East 200 North P.O. Box "L" VINCENT B. MEISTER 
Provo, UT 84603-0200 Salt Lake District Attorney's Office 
Counsel for Appellant Counsel for Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
Summary of Proceedings 3 
Summary of Facts 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 9 
ARGUMENT 10 
EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT WAS A MEMBER OF THE SILENT 
ARYAN WARRIORS PRISON GANG WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED 
BY THE TRIAL COURT 10 
A. DEFENDANT DID NOT PRESERVE HIS RULE 404(B) CLAIM AND 
AFFIRMATIVELY WAIVED ANY PLAIN ERROR CHALLENGE TO THE 
"S. A. W." TESTIMONY 10 
B. ADMISSION OF THE "S.A.W." TESTIMONY WAS NOT PLAINLY 
ERRONEOUS UNDER RULE 404(B) 15 
1. The Evidence of Defendant's Membership in S.A.W. Was Offered for 
a Proper Noncharacter Purpose 16 
2. The Evidence of Defendant's Membership in S.A.W. Was Relevant 18 
3. The Danger of Unfair Prejudice from Introducing Evidence of 
Defendant's Membership in S.A.W. Did Not Substantially Outweigh 
the Probative Value of that Evidence 20 
CONCLUSION 22 
i 
NO ADDENDUM NECESSARY 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
FEDERAL CASES 
McQueen v. Scroggy, 99 F.3d 1302 (6th Cir. 1996), cert, denied, 520 U.S. 
1257, 117 S.Ct. 2422 (1997) 14 
Ryan v. Clarke, 281 F.Supp.2d 1008 (D. Neb. 2003) 14 
Washingtonv. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 87 S.Ct. 1920 (1967) 12 
STATE CASES 
People v. Funes, 28 Cal. Rptr.2d 758 (Cal. 1994) 16 
Statev. Bloomfield, 2003 UTApp 3, 63?.3d \ 10 18 
State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, 25 P.3d 985 19 
State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, 55 P.3d 573 13 
State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, 993 P.2d 837 passim 
State v. Morgan, 813 P.2d 1207 (Utah App. 1991) 19 
State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, 6 P.3d 1120 17 
State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, 992P.2d951 17 
State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291 (Utah 1988) 18, 20 
State v. Smith, 728 P.2d 1014 (Utah 1986) 19 
State v. Win-ward, 941 P.2d 627 (Utah App. 1997) 1, 11, 15 
STATE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 2001) 3 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (Supp. 2001) 3 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l (1999) 2, 13 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (1996) 3 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2002) 1 
i i i 
STATE RULES 
Utah R. Evid. 401 2, 18, 19 
Utah R. Evid. 402 2 
Utah R. Evid. 403 2, 20 
Utah R. Evid. 404 2, 15, 16 
IV 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
KENNETH PAUL HUNTER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20030126-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
* * is 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for aggravated kidnapping, a first degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (Supp. 2001). This Court has jurisdiction under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Did the trial court act within its discretion in admitting evidence that defendant was a 
member of a white supremacist gang whose members generally join while in prison? 
Standard of Review. A trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence of other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Decor so, 1999 UT 
57, \ 18,993 P.2d 837. However, if no objection is made to the evidence, this Court reviews 
the decision under the plain error standard. State v. Winward, 941 P.2d 627,633 (Utah App. 
1997). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l (1999) 
(2)(d) When two or more defendants are jointly charged with any offense, 
they shall be tried jointly unless the court in its discretion on motion or 
otherwise orders separate trials consistent with the interests of justice. 
(4)(a) If the court finds a defendant or the prosecution is prejudiced... by 
a joinder for trial together, the court shall . . . grant a severance of defendants 
Utah R. Evid. 401 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. 
Utah R. Evid. 402 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the 
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, 
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state. 
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. 
Utah R. Evid. 403 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Utah R. Evid. 404(b) 
(b) Other crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or 
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action 
in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, 
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the 
accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in 
advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good 
cause shown, of the nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant was charged with felony murder, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 2001), and aggravated kidnapping, a first degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (Supp. 2001). R. 3-6,61-64,136-39. Following a 
five-day trial, a jury found defendant guilty of both counts as charged. R. 149-50, 216-20. 
Defendant was sentenced to consecutive prison terms of five-years-to-life for murder and 
ten-years-to-life for aggravated kidnapping. R. 197-98. Defendant timely appealed. R.200-
01. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (1996), the Utah Supreme Court transferred the 
appeal to this Court. R. 214. 
SUMMARY OF FACTS 
On the evening of October 9, 2001, Derek Johnson visited Lori McFalls and Don 
Dorton at Lori's house, where the three smoked dope (methamphetamine). R. 223: 39, 68, 
188-89. Also at the house was a little girl sleeping on a bed downstairs. R. 223: 159-60. At 
approximately 7:00 p.m., Larry Rasmussen and Darren Grueber arrived at the apartment. R. 
223: 39.1 
Rasmussen was among the highest ranking members of a gang known as S.A.W., or 
Silent Aryan Warriors. R. 224: 176. Grueber was Rasmussen's "probate"—an individual 
1
 Grueber was also known as "Little Buck." R. 223: 48. 
3 
attempting to earn membership into the gang. R. 224: 151-53.2 A probate proves himself 
worthy of membership by "standing] up for himself, fight[ing]," and doing what the 
members ask of him. R. 224: 152-53. Under the gang's bylaws, members pledge 
unquestioning loyalty to the gang and to one another, committing to "never deny S.A.W. or 
bring disrespect to the movement." R. 224: 165-66. 
At the apartment, Rasmussen pulled out his meth pipe and shared it with the group. 
R. 223: 40, 69-70. When the group finished smoking, McFalls cooked Rasmussen a steak. 
R. 223:40. After eating, Rasmussen looked for his dope but could not find it. R. 223: 40-
41. Suspecting that either Johnson or Dorton had stolen it, Rasmussen became infuriated. R. 
223:156. He went outside with McFalls and telephoned Cal Jensen—a S.A. W. enforcer—to 
come and look for the dope and "intimidate" the two other men. See R. 223:41, 70,153-56, 
188; R. 224: 130-33; 176-77, 182, 215; R. 225: 68.3 In addition, Rasmussen telephoned 
Dave Campbell and defendant—also S.A.W. members—to come and assist him. R. 224:76, 
131,135. McFalls came back inside and told Johnson and Dorton that they "better find the 
shit cause Larry called the guys in." R. 223: 41, 70. 
An hour or two later, Jensen drove to the house in a friend's truck, bringing with him 
his girlfriend, Dawn Heras, and Pat Graves—another S.A.W. member. R. 223: 42, 152-54; 
2
 Although members of S.A.W. usually earn membership in prison, Grueber was 
attempting to earn his membership outside of prison. R. 224: 151, 177-78. 
Rasmussen also promised that he would pay Jensen $400 of an outstanding debt he 
owed to Jensen for methamphetamine precursors. R.223:191;R.224:133-34,215;R. 225: 
68-69. 
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R. 224:131-34; R. 225:27.4 Less than a half hour later, Campbell and defendant arrived. R. 
223:42, 156; R. 224:135. The S.A.W. gang searched the house for the dope. R. 224:134-
36,156. After awhile, Jensen took Dorton and Johnson downstairs to a bedroom, where they 
were strip searched by defendant and Campbell, but no drugs were found on either man. R. 
223: 42-45, 94; R. 224: 136. 
Some fifteen minutes later, Heras yelled that she found the dope underneath the little 
girl who lay asleep. R. 223: 162; R. 224: 137, 182. She immediately accused Dorton of 
hiding the dope there, entering the bedroom where he and Johnson were being held and 
yelling, "You mother f—er, you hid the dope in the baby stuff.'5 R. 223: 45, 162; R. 224: 
183. Rasmussen subsequently entered the room and began beating Dorton. R. 223: 45-46, 
162-63; R. 224: 137, 183. Rasmussen then stepped into the hallway and told Jensen that 
Dorton had stashed the dope under the little girl. R. 224:137,183. Jensen entered the room, 
and after asking Dorton whether he had taken the dope, kicked him in the face so hard that 
blood splattered on the walls and ceiling. R.224:19,26,137-39,183,215,229; seeR. 223: 
166. 
Defendant, Campbell, Graves, and Grueber entered the room and also began beating 
Dorton. SeeR. 223: 46-49; R. 224: 139,184. Grueber kicked Dorton so hard that Dorton's 
eye partially dislodged from the socket. R. 224: 26-27, 71. As they beat Dorton, the men 
told him that he should not have hid the dope under the little girl, that as S.A.W. brothers 
4
 Both Jensen and Dawn had been up for days using methamphetamine and heroine. 
R.223: 187,202,211-12. 
5 
they were family, and that it was "f ed up" for him to put the dope underneath the little girl. 
R. 223: 165-66. After Johnson was escorted from the room, defendant and Graves held 
defendant down while Grueber bound Dorton's ankles and hands with duct tape. R. 223: 
110,166;R.224:140-41,184-85. He also covered Dorton's mouth with duct tape. R.223: 
170. After binding him with duct tape, the men resumed the beating. See R. 224: 140-41. 
Grueber, defendant, and Campbell, then carried Dorton upstairs, followed by Graves. 
R. 224:141-44,233-34. As he was carried up, Dorton pleaded for someone to help him, but 
no one would. R. 223: 49,200; R. 224:142. Rasmussen told the men to keep Dorton quiet. 
R. 223: 168, 190; R. 224: 143-44. Grueber, who was not a S.A.W. "brother," asked 
Rasmussen if he could kill Dorton as initiation into the gang. R. 224: 72, 75. Rasmussen 
agreed. R. 224: 72. 
Defendant, Grueber, and Graves then carried Dorton back downstairs, where Grueber 
wrapped Dorton's body with a bed sheet and with multiple windings of duct tape. R. 223: 
110-12,168-69; R. 224: 71-72,143-44. He also covered Dorton's head with a pillow case, 
stuffing his mouth with part of it. R. 223:49, 110-12,135,171. As he wrapped Dorton, the 
men continued to deride Dorton for hiding the drugs and Grueber continued to punch and 
kick Dorton. R. 223: 170-71, 191. Defendant then helped Grueber carry Dorton back 
upstairs and out the back door. R.223: 50-51; R. 224:144-45,234; R. 225: 77. They asked 
Jensen if he would take Dorton in the back of his truck, but Jensen refused so they carried 
him to Campbell's car. R. 223: 52, 78; R. 224: 145-46, 186. At some point during the 
kidnapping, defendant took Dorton's cell phone from him. See R. 223: 177-78. 
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Rasmussen left in his vehicle, headed for the broken down transit bus he had 
converted into a makeshift residence. R. 223: 173; R. 224: 9, 20, 44, 58-59; R. 224: 144. 
Defendant, Graves, and Heras left with Jensen in his truck, also headed for Rasmussen's bus. 
R. 223:196-97,209-10; R. 224:144,146; R. 225; 65,67,78. Grueber and Johnson left with 
Campbell, taking Dorton with them. R. 223: 52-53; R. 224: 72. 
When Rasmussen arrived at the bus, Holly Frickey, who had been helping repair the 
bus that day, was still there. R. 223: 197; R. 224: 9-12, 40; R. 224: 147. A few minutes 
later, Jensen, Heras, Graves, and defendant arrived in the truck. See R. 223:173-75; R. 224: 
12-13, 59; R. 224: 146-47, 214. The group smoked dope as they waited for Campbell and 
the others to arrive. R. 223: 174-76; R. 224: 148. Rasmussen expressed concern that this 
would come back on him, but Jensen assured him that he need not worry because Dorton 
was taking a "permanent vacation." R. 224: 15, 18; but see R. 224: 217. When Frickey 
asked if Dorton was dead, Jensen responded affirmatively. R. 224: 15. 
Campbell did not drive to Rasmussen's bus like the rest, but drove to a secluded area 
by a cattle ranch near Magna. R. 223: 54-55,77-78; R. 224:18,47-49, 73. After Campbell, 
Grueber, and Johnson relieved themselves, Grueber instructed Johnson to help him remove 
Dorton from the car and then directed Campbell and Johnson to drive further off down the 
road and wait for him. R. 223: 55-56, 79; R. 224: 73. Grueber dragged Dorton into a ditch, 
picked up a rock weighing 83 pounds, and dropped it onto Dorton's head, killing him. R. 
223: 56, 790, 108-09, 121-31, 135, 141; R. 224: 30, 73-74, 107. After killing Dorton, 
Grueber returned to the car with blood on his shirt, "pretty excited, breathing pretty hard." 
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R. 223: 56-58; R. 224: 74. On the way to Rasmussen's bus, the three stopped to buy 
doughnuts and drinks. See R. 223: 56-58, 69, 79-80, 155-56, 176; R. 224: 75. During the 
ride, Grueber gave Johnson his full name, asked Johnson for his, and threatened him with his 
life—warning him that he would hunt him down and do the same if he told anyone. R. 223: 
57, 80; R. 224: 76. 
Once Campbell, Grueber, and Johnson joined the rest at the bus, Rasmussen shared 
his drugs with everyone as a reward for their participation that night. R. 223: 192. As they 
ate doughnuts, drank sodas, and smoked dope, the S.A.W. brothers bragged about their 
exploits that night. R. 223: 58-59, 69, 80, 94, 198; R. 224: 9, 13-17, 59, 148. Rasmussen 
and Jensen marveled about how Grueber had "really f d [Dorton] up" and had "really 
kick[ed] his ass." R. 223:175;R. 224:13. Some expressed concern that Dorton might talk, 
but Grueber assured them that they need not worry because he took care of it—that he 
"finished" him with a rock. R. 223: 59-61, 81; R. 224: 148,150,217-18. While at the bus, 
Grueber obtained a flame thrower from Rasmussen and incinerated his blood-stained shirt. 
R. 223: 61,176-77; R. 224: 21-22,49, 75, 149. Grueber also licked blood off of one of his 
gloves. R. 224: 23. Grueber suggested that he bury the body, but Rasmussen advised 
against it. R. 224: 24. 
Eventually, defendant and Johnson left with Campbell. R. 223: 61, 91. Later, as 
morning approached, Jensen, Graves, and Heras returned to McFalls's house. R. 224:150; 
R. 225: 65-66. While there, Jensen and Heras cleaned the blood from the room where 
Dorton had been beaten. R.223: 181, 215; R. 224: 150, 214; R. 225: 30-31, 66. 
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The following evening, Johnson went to the site where Dorton had been left and 
confirmed that he was dead. R. 223: 61-63. The S.A.W. brothers also met together twice 
after the murder, discussing possible steps they needed to take to conceal their involvement 
from police. R. 224: 224. In one of those meetings, defendant was told that he should get 
rid of defendant's cell phone. R. 224: 167-68, 223-25. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims that the evidence of defendant's membership in the Silent Aryan 
Warriors prison gang was inadmissible under rule 404(b). Defendant not only failed to raise 
that issue below, but affirmatively waived it. Defendant understood that the co-defendant's 
defense rested on evidence that the gang was a prison gang. Yet, defendant did not move for 
severance of the trial, apparently electing to purse a trial strategy that attempted to focus the 
jury's attention on the co-defendant's more culpable acts over defendant's arguably less 
egregious facts. He also elected to address the Aryan issue directly. 
Assuming arguendo that defendant did not affirmatively waive his 404(b) claim, it 
still fails under the plain error standard. The evidence was offered to prove defendant's 
motive for participating in the crime. Evidence of motive was highly relevant because 
defendant claimed he was an innocent bystander. And finally, the danger of undue prejudice 
was minimal because the jury was entitled to know in any event that he belonged to a gang. 
9 
ARGUMENT 
EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT WAS A MEMBER OF THE SILENT 
ARYAN WARRIORS PRISON GANG WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED 
BY THE TRIAL COURT 
Defendant claims that under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, the trial court erred 
in admitting evidence that he was a member of a prison gang known as the Silent Aryan 
Warriors or "S.A.W." ApltBrf. at 34-43. Defendant's claim fails. 
A. DEFENDANT DID NOT PRESERVE HIS RULE 404(B) CLAIM AND 
AFFIRMATIVELY WAIVED ANY PLAIN ERROR CHALLENGE TO THE 
"S.A.W." TESTIMONY 
Defendant acknowledges that his counsel did not identify rule 404(b) as the basis of 
his objections to the gang evidence, but claims that his repeated objections to certain gang 
testimony were sufficient to preserve the issue. Aplt. Brf. at 1, 42 (citing R. 224: 155-63). 
This claim lacks merit. 
When the prosecutor asked Cal Jensen to testify about the swastika tattoo S.A.W. 
members wear, defendant objected on the basis of relevance. R. 224: 153, 156. The court 
overruled defendant's objection and admitted a photograph of defendant wearing the tattoo, 
thus establishing his membership in the gang. R. 224: 166-67. When the prosecutor 
attempted to introduce S.A.W.'s bylaws pledging loyalty to the gang, defendant again 
objected on relevancy grounds, arguing that no evidence existed establishing his exposure to 
the bylaws. R. 224: 156, 162. The trial court overruled defendant's objection, but limited 
testimony to those bylaws requiring solidarity among members and establishing the 
hierarchy of gang members. R. 224: 159-60, 163-64. At no time, therefore, did defendant 
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suggest to the court that the S.A.W. evidence was only being offered to prove his bad 
character and that he acted in conformity therewith, in violation of rule 404(b). Moreover, 
defendant voiced no objection to the evidence that S.A.W. was an acronym for Silent Aryan 
Warriors or that it was a prison gang. See R. 224: 153-66. 
The law is well-settled that "'the grounds for [an] objection must be distinctly and 
specifically stated'" and that a failure to do so constitutes a waiver of the claim absent plain 
error. State v. Winward, 941 P.2d627,633 (Utah App. 1997)(quoting State v. Johnson, 114 
P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989)) (emphasis added). "[T]o establish plain error, [defendant] 
must show the following: '(i) An error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the 
trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful.'" Winward, 941 P.2d at 634 (quoting State v. Dunn, 
850 P.2d 1201,1208 (Utah 1993)). However, this Court will not even consider a plain error 
claim if the failure to object was a "tactical decision" that foreclosed the trial court's 
opportunity to cure an alleged error. Id. Such was the case here. 
To understand that defendant made a tactical decision not to object to evidence that he 
was a member of an Aryan prison gang, the Court need only compare defendant's defense 
strategy with that of his co-defendant, Darren Grueber. Grueber's counsel repeatedly 
discussed the gang's prison and white supremacist moorings in his opening statement, all 
without objection: 
S.A.W. is a very organized and sort of military like Aryan brotherhood that 
is & prison gang. Okay? And you have to be in prison to be inside. It's a 
prison Aryan gang. And the reasons for that may be obvious to you. They get 
together in prison so you have some protection. And it flows outside of 
prison. Once you're outside of prison you have your S.A.W. brothers. But it 
is a very organized brotherhood gang and it begins at the very top with a very 
11 
organized council. A council of lieutenants, one of whom is Larry 
[Rasmussen], who you're going to hear about quite a bit. . .. Larry and the 
council of S.A.W. make the decisions, anything important that S.A.W. does. 
Okay? 
So we go down to the warriors, or the soldiers. And of the people there 
there's David [Campbell], there's Pat [Graves] and there's [defendant]. And 
they are all S.A.W. brothers. All right? They are all in this group, this prison 
gang, and have, you know, gotten out of prison and now are still part of the 
S.A.W. brotherhood. This still works outside of prison, apparently, but you 
have to go to prison to get into the S.A. W. gang, S.A. W. brotherhood. 
Now [co-defendant Grueber] is not a S.A.W. member. He couldn't be 
because he's never been to prison... . But [Grueber] was an outsider and had 
no way of getting into the S.A.W. brotherhood because you have to go to 
prison to do that. In fact, that's where you make your S.A. W, brotherhood 
connections is by going to prison and being in prison and having that gang 
protection. 
R. 223: 19-21 (emphasis added). Thus, from the beginning of trial, and likely before,5 
defendant understood that his co-defendant's defense would rely on evidence that S.A.W. 
was a prison gang—Grueber had never been to prison, he was not a member of S.A.W., and 
he could not become a member of S.A.W , because it was a prison gang. Clearly, Grueber 
maintained "the right to present a defense, [and] the right to present [his] version of the 
facts." Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 1923 (1967). Knowing this, 
defendant's counsel understood that evidence regarding the gang's prison moorings was 
admissible at the joint trial and that any objection to it would have been futile. 
5
 On cross-examination by Grueber's counsel during the preliminary hearing, Jensen 
testified that he understood the only way to join the gang was to be in prison. R. 242: 577. 
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If, as defendant now claims, the evidence of S.A.W.'s prison or Aryan moorings 
should not have been admitted at his trial, he could have moved to sever his trial from that of 
his co-defendant. Section 77-8a-l specifically provides for the severance of co-defendants' 
trials if "a defendant... is prejudiced... by a joinder for trial together." Utah Code Ann. § 
77-8a-l(4)(a) (1999). The Utah Supreme Court has further held that "'[djoubts concerning 
prejudice should be resolved by the trial court in favor of the defendant . . . . ' " State v. 
Calliham, 2002 UT 86, f 34, 55 P.3d 573 (quoting State v. Collins, 612 P.2d 775,777 (Utah 
1980)). 
Notwithstanding this avenue of relief, defendant did not move for severance. He has 
not argued ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal, and a review of his theory of the case 
at trial reveals why he has not done so. Defendant did not put on any witnesses, but 
challenged the credibility of the State's witnesses who testified that he participated in the 
beating and aggravated kidnapping of Mr. Dorton. In both his opening statement and closing 
argument, defendant's counsel claimed that defendant was no more than an innocent 
bystander at the house and tried to focus the jury's attention away from defendant to those 
who were at the murder scene, and in particular, to the person who dropped the rock—all of 
the evidence indicated that that person was co-defendant Grueber. See R. 223: 26-28, R. 
226: 50-67. Allowing the jury to physically compare the two and implicitly asking them to 
focus on Grueber rather than defendant was reasonable trial strategy. See McQueen v. 
Scroggy, 99 F.3d 1302, 1316 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that counsel's decision not to seek a 
separate trial was a reasonable tactical decision "based on the hope that a joint trial would 
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cloud the issue of guilt by allowing [defendant] to hide behind his less culpable half-
brother"), cert denied, 520 U.S. 1257, 117 S.Ct. 2422 (1997); Ryan v. Clarke, 281 
F.Supp.2d 1008,1082 (D. Neb. 2003) (recognizing that counsel's decision to try a father and 
son together so jury could see the two interact with each other was a reasonable tactical 
decision). 
Defendant also chose not to object to evidence indicating that S.A.W. was an Aryan 
gang. During the State's opening statement, the prosecutor explained that defendant and the 
others involved were members of a gang known as "S.A.W., Silent Aryan Warriors, a white 
supremacist group." R. 223: 10. Defendant did not object. See R. 223: 10. And as noted, 
he did not object to Grueber's counsel's opening statement referencing the gang's Aryan 
moorings. SeeR. 223:19-21. Rather than object, defendant's counsel chose to address that 
fact directly in his own opening statement: 
This case isn't about S.A.W., this case isn't about Silent Aryan Warriors. 
If we were to convict [defendant] just based on that membership we wouldn't 
need a trial. We're here to see what people involved have done. This 
organization is not a defendant. . . . This is not, again, a trial about that. 
Everyone took a survey and said, probably we don't like gangs, but gang 
membership in and of itself is not a crime. What's a crime is to drop a rock on 
someone's head. , . . Again, membership in a gang, in and of itself, is nothing. 
Again, although people will try to make this a gang case, this isn't about 
Silent Aryan Warriors, this is about what human beings do to other human 
beings. [Defendant] wasn't there when that rock was dropped on Mr. Dorton. 
R. 223: 29-30. Defendant's counsel also said later that he had no objection to a closing 
argument from co-defendant's counsel that Grueber would not have a motive to join the 
Aryan gang because his girlfriend was African-American. R. 226: 7-8. 
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* * * 
Because of defendant's apparent strategy to be tried with co-defendant Grueber and 
his election to address the Aryan nature of the gang directly, he affirmatively waived any 
plain error claim long before such evidence was introduced. See Winward, 941 P.2d at 633. 
His claim on appeal thus fails. 
B. ADMISSION OF THE "S.A.W." TESTIMONY WAS NOT PLAINLY 
ERRONEOUS UNDER RULE 404(B) 
Assuming arguendo that defendant did not affirmatively waive his 404(b) claim, it 
still fails under the plain error standard. Rule 404(b) provides: 
(b) Other crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or 
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action 
in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, 
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the 
accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in 
advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good 
cause shown, of the nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial. 
Utah R. Evid. 404(b). In State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, 993 P.2d 837, the Utah Supreme 
Court held that in deciding whether evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible 
under rule 404(b), the trial court must engage in a three-part analysis. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, 
f^ 20. "[T]he trial court must determine (1) whether such evidence is being offered for a 
proper, noncharacter purpose under 404(b), (2) whether such evidence meets the 
requirements of rule 402, and (3) whether this evidence meets the requirements of rule 403." 
Id. 
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1. The Evidence of Defendant's Membership in S.A.W. Was Offered 
for a Proper Noncharacter Purpose. 
Under step one of the analysis, the trial court must determine whether "the evidence is 
actually being offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose, such as [proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident]." Decorso, 1999 UT 57, \ 21; Utah R. Evid. 404(b). Defendant contends that the 
prosecution introduced the S A. W. evidence "only . . . to show that [defendant] had been in 
prison and that he was a member of a[n] extremist white supremacist gang and therefore had 
a criminal disposition and propensity to commit crime." Aplt. Brf. at 34-35. This contention 
lacks merit. 
Defendant's membership in the S.A.W. gang established the motive for defendant's 
participation in the beating and aggravated kidnapping of Mr. Dorton. See People v. Funes, 
28 Cal. Rptr.2d 758,765 (Cal. 1994) (holding that "it is proper to introduce evidence of gang 
affiliation and activity where such evidence is relevant to an issue of motive or intent"). 
Defendant challenges this claim, contending that the evidence already demonstrated that the 
motive for the assault and kidnapping was that Mr. Dorton had allegedly stolen drugs from 
Rasmussen and hid them beneath a sleeping child. Aplt. Brf. at 35. That, however, only 
explains why Rasmussen and perhaps the child's mother were upset with Mr. Dorton. It 
does not explain why defendant would be moved to participate in the assault and kidnapping. 
His membership in the S.A.W. gang does. 
The S.A.W. evidence established that Rasmussen was a ranking council member of 
S.A.W. R.224: 176. It established that S.A.W. brothers pledge "unquestionable" loyalty to 
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the gang and to each other. R. 224: 165-66. The evidence also established that under the 
gang's bylaws, members pledged to "secure the existence of our people and the future way 
for our white children." R. 224: 165. The evidence, therefore, established the reason 
defendant would "intimidate" Mr. Dorton at the call of Rasmussen: Rasmussen was a 
ranking council member and defendant had pledged his loyalty to him and others in the gang. 
It also explained why defendant and the others were so upset with the fact the dope was 
hidden under the child—they had pledged to secure the future way of their children. 
Contrary to defendant's claim, Aplt. Brf. at 34-35, this case is not similar to State v. 
Saunders, 1999 UT 59, 992 P.2d 951. To demonstrate that defendant was guilty of sexually 
abusing his daughter on a particular occasion, the prosecutor in Saunders introduced 
evidence that defendant had inappropriately touched his daughter in the past. In that case, 
"the prosecutor urged the jury to convict on the basis of the acts alleged to have occurred 
[prior to the act charged]." Id. at f 29. The evidence was thus used solely to infer guilt 
based on the defendant's criminal character or propensity to commit bad acts in violation of 
rule 404(b). As noted above, defendant's gang affiliation was not used for that purpose. 
Relying on State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59,6 P.3d 1120, defendant complains 
that no instruction was given advising the jury that they could only consider the evidence for 
purposes of motive and could not consider it as a propensity to commit the crime. Aplt. Brf. 
at 36. The trial court invited counsel to offer just such an instruction: 
I guess we could give an instruction at some point that would indicate that just 
because someone is a member of the gang doesn't mean they are guilty of this 
crime. The State would have to prove that they acted in some way. 
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R. 224: 163. Although the State indicated that it would have no objection to such an 
instruction, R. 224: 163, defendant never offered one and later affirmatively represented to 
the trial court that he had no exceptions to the instructions as proposed. See 76-86; R. 226: 
4. He thus waived any challenge to the court's failure to include the instruction. See State v. 
Bloomfield, 2003 UT App 3, *[} 12, 63 P.3d 110 (holding that defendant waived challenge to 
jury instructions where he stipulated to them). 
2. The Evidence of Defendant's Membership in S.A.W. Was Relevant. 
Under step two of the analysis, the trial court must determine whether the evidence is 
relevant as required under rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence. Decor so, 1999 UT 57, f 22. 
Rule 401 defines relevant evidence as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence 
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence." Utah R. Evid. 401. In other words, "other 
crimes evidence must have 'a special relevance to a controverted issue and [must be] 
introduced for a purpose other than to show the defendant's predisposition to criminality.'" 
Decorso, 1999 UT 57, f 22 (quoting State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291,295 (Utah 1988)) (other 
quotes and citations omitted). Thus, "unless the other crimes evidence tends to prove some 
fact that is material to the crime charged . . . it is irrelevant and should be excluded by the 
court pursuant to rule 402." Id. 
Defendant claimed that he was no more than an innocent bystander, but was simply 
"at the wrong place at the wrong time." See R. 223:28 ; R. 226: 52. In light of defendant's 
position, a reason or motive for participating in the crime became highly relevant. 
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3. The Danger of Unfair Prejudice from Introducing Evidence of 
Defendant's Membership in S.A.W. Did Not Substantially 
Outweigh the Probative Value of that Evidence. 
Under the final step of the analysis, the trial court must determine whether the other 
crimes evidence satisfies rule 403, that is, whether the probative value of the evidence was 
"'substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence.'" Decorso, 1999 UT 57, fflf 23, 25 (quoting Utah R. 
Evid. 403) (emphasis added by the court). It was not. 
In Shickles, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
"In deciding whether the danger of unfair prejudice and the like substantially 
outweighs the incremental probative value, a variety of matters must be 
considered, including the strength of the evidence as to the commission of the 
other crime, the similarities between the crimes, the interval of time that has 
elapsed between the crimes, the need for the evidence, the efficacy of 
alternative proof, and the degree to which the evidence probably will rouse the 
jury to overmastering hostility." 
Shickles, 760 P.2d at 295-96 (quoting E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence § 190, at 565 (3d 
ed. 1984)). Upon applying those factors here, it is evident that the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in admitting evidence that defendant was a member of the S A. W. prison gang. 
First, contrary to defendant's claim, the evidence against defendant was quite strong. 
The testimony was unequivocal that defendant responded to Rasmussen's call to come to the 
house. R. 224: 76, 131, 135. Both Cal Jensen and Derek Johnson—who defendant 
specifically notes was the victim's friend—testified that defendant strip searched Johnson 
and Dorton. R. 223: 43-45, 94; R. 224: 136. Thus, contrary to defendant's defense, he was 
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21 
example, the jury was aware that defendant had come to the house to intimidate the victim in 
response to a call from Rasmussen. See R. 224: 76,131,135. The jury knew that defendant 
belonged to a gang whose members swore loyalty to each other and whose members are 
initiated into the gang by "fighting." R. 224: 152-53. Defendant does not suggest that this 
evidence should not have been admitted. In other words, the jury knew in any event that 
defendant belonged to a violent gang. The fact that this gang was a prison gang with Aryan 
beliefs was thus not likely to increase any risk of unfair prejudice. 
* * * 
In sum, the trial court did not plainly err in admitting the evidence that defendant 
belonged to the S.A.W. prison gang. It was offered for the proper noncharacter purpose of 
establishing defendant's motive for participating in the assault and kidnapping. It was also 
offered to aid in the co-defendant's defense. Finally, its probative value was not 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
defendant's convictions. 
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